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The Office of Evaluation and Oversight (OVE) of the Inter-American Development Bank 
(IDB, or the Bank) conducted an impact evaluation to assess the effectiveness of the 
main types of programs through which IDB has supported small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs) in Latin America and the Caribbean. It does not evaluate Bank 
projects directly or compare executing agencies, models of interventions or financial 
instruments, but rather examines the effectiveness of Bank-supported approaches 
implemented by Brazilian institutions. Focusing only on the manufacturing sector, 
the evaluation examines how these interventions affect firm-level outcomes such 
as employment, real wages, exports, and patent and trademark registration. The 
overarching objective of this exercise is to provide insight for future strategic decisions 
regarding the targeting of Bank support to SMEs.
The rationale for choosing Brazil is threefold: (i) Brazil represents 55% of IDB’s total 
volume of lending supporting SMEs; (ii) country stakeholders have collected data from 
SMEs exposed to various types of interventions, allowing OVE to learn about alternative 
SME support approaches in Brazil; and (iii) OVE has access to comprehensive datasets 
that facilitate impact evaluations in Brazil.
OVE bases the analysis on the types of interventions the Bank has supported in Brazil, 
compares the results they achieved, and draws lessons for the future design and 
implementation of SME support strategies and budget allocation considerations.
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Executive Summary
The Office of Evaluation and Oversight (OVE) of the Inter-
American Development Bank (IDB, or the Bank) conducted 
an impact evaluation to assess the effectiveness of the main 
types of programs through which IDB has supported small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in Latin America and the 
Caribbean (LAC). It does not evaluate Bank projects directly 
or compare executing agencies, models of interventions, or 
financial instruments, but rather examines the effectiveness 
of Bank-supported approaches implemented by Brazilian 
institutions. Focusing only on the manufacturing sector, the 
evaluation examines (i) how various SME interventions and 
various combinations of these interventions affect variables of 
interest such as employment, real wages, exports, and patent 
and trademark registration in Brazil; and (ii) to what extent 
the duration and sequencing of SME interventions influence 
their impact on these variables of interest. The overarching 
objective of this exercise is to provide insight for future strategic 
decisions about the targeting of Bank support to SMEs.
Institutional and market failures impede SMEs from reaching the necessary size 
to generate economic growth. SMEs suffer more than larger firms from inflexible 
regulations and standards, high registration costs and high tax rates. At the same time, 
weak institutions and poor coordination hinder the public sector from providing 
the services that SMEs need. Therefore, SMEs often turn involuntarily toward 
informality and operate at scales below minimum efficiency levels, underperforming 
in terms of average productivity, growth, and innovation compared to larger firms. 
Large enterprises in LAC are six times more productive than SMEs, while those in 
developed economies are only 1.3 to 2.4 times more productive. 
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Incomplete, imperfect, and asymmetric information hinders SMEs’ access to 
financing and business consulting. Since information constraints hamper banks’ 
risk assessment of SMEs, SMEs—particularly those investing in growth and 
innovation—have difficulty accessing credit. Because innovation projects are 
complex and lack appropriability, they are both costly and risky; thus banks require 
a higher premium to finance innovation activities. SMEs are less able than large 
firms to invest in innovation since they lack collateral and reputation and have 
higher risk profiles.
SME support is not immune to criticism. It is not clear that small firms use resources 
more productively at the margin than medium and large firms. And even if SME 
programs may indeed boost the productivity of beneficiary firms, some argue that in 
the aggregate the effects would be greater if support were open to all firms regardless 
of their size, particularly companies in the formal sector. 
Nevertheless, a substantial share of the economic development literature suggests that 
well-targeted policies aimed at promoting SMEs can lead to positive development 
outcomes. SMEs are a fundamental part of the economic fabric in developing 
countries. In LAC, SMEs account for nearly 99% of firms and 67% of employment. 
The challenge is to continuously increase the productivity of the SME sector so that 
it can effectively contribute to economic development. 
Several LAC countries have adopted public policies to promote SMEs through a 
number of development agencies. The Bank has responded with various types of 
interventions (9% of the IDB portfolio from 2006-2013) to address market failures 
that hamper the development of SMEs across the LAC region. 
Brazilian institutions have historically partnered among themselves when 
implementing their SME support programs, and seven Brazilian agencies established 
partnerships with OVE to conduct an impact evaluation of their programs: Brazilian 
Agency of Industrial Development, Brazilian Trade and Investment Promotion 
Agency, Northeast Bank of Brazil, Brazilian Development Bank, Brazilian 
Innovation Agency, National Institute of Metrology, Quality and Technology, and 
Brazilian Small Business Support Service. The availability of their datasets allows for 
the assessment of the different types of SME support: credit, business consulting, 
innovation, export promotion and agglomeration. 
OVE was also able to access a wide range of data on the variables of interest, 
including the Ministry of Labor’s census of all Brazilian establishments from 2001 to 
2012, which includes microdata on wages and employment; the National Institute 
of Intellectual Property database on patent and trademark registrations; and the 
Secretary of Foreign Trade’s dataset on exports (showing ranges of export values). 
OVE adopted the threshold that is most common in the literature for the definition 
of SMEs (fewer than 250 employees).
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Benefiting from the availability of a panel dataset with a large number of 
establishments, OVE adopted the fixed-effects (FE) model combined with 
propensity-score matching (PSM) techniques. The PSM compares treated and non-
treated groups that differ only with respect to treatment but otherwise have the 
same observed characteristics. To help avoid selection bias, OVE verified that both 
treated and control establishments exhibit the same trends prior to the programs. 
The analysis shows that some interventions generated positive results, but the overall 
findings should be read with caution. First, the overall impact ignores general 
equilibrium effects. Second, the assessment does not incorporate spillover effects on 
indirect beneficiaries of some interventions. Finally, some types of interventions are 
expected to produce medium and long-run effects, which could not be captured by 
the available timeframe of the database used by OVE.
Overall, the analysis finds that credit support is the only type of support that 
significantly affects all outcome variables, and it also has the most positive impact on 
employment and wages. The estimations suggest that establishments that received 
credit support experienced a 15% increase in their number of workers (3 jobs per 
establishment). If credit support had the same average effect and were available for 
all establishments, this would generate approximately 546,000 extra jobs in SMEs 
in the manufacturing sector alone. Participating in a credit program also resulted in 
a 2.4% increase in wages and significant gains in the value of exports and trademark 
registrations. For every 1,000 firms that received credit support, on average, nearly 
2 of them registered a trademark.
The success of credit lines is related to the incentives created by program design. 
SMEs should use the funds not only for working capital but also to invest in 
goods, such as transportation equipment and computers that ultimately boost their 
performance. 
Export support has a significantly positive impact on the value of exports and 
produces employment benefits. SMEs that received this support increased their 
number of employees by 11% on average (2.6 jobs per establishment), implying a 
potential for nearly 462,000 extra jobs in the manufacturing sector alone. Export 
promotion does not affect wages, but its impact on patents and trademarks is 
significant. Six additional trademarks are registered for every 1,000 establishments 
receiving support. Participation in an innovation program did not affect wages and 
employment but had a positive impact on exports.
OVE’s results encourage future research regarding the “learning by exporting” 
hypothesis. Although no data were available to measure productivity gains, export 
programs were able to generate positive impacts both in exports and in patents 
and trademarks. Firms more exposed to external competition have incentives to 
innovate and to protect their innovations from competitors.
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The estimations suggest that agglomeration support alone has no positive impact on 
outcomes for the establishments that participated in those programs. It is possible 
that cluster support, one of the most important activities classified by OVE under 
this category, was targeted to groups of entrepreneurs that could not be characterized 
as clusters. In this case, an intervention designed to develop clusters would be 
ineffective.
OVE results show that business consulting alone has a positive impact on 
employment, and that impact increases when combined with credit support. SMEs 
that received business consulting in addition to credit increased their number of 
employees by 16% on average (3.6 jobs per establishment).
The combination of export support and credit programs increases export more 
than credit alone, reinforcing the finding that export programs are well targeted. 
In addition, the impact of credit and export support on innovation is significant. 
The combination of both treatments led to an additional 12 trademarks registered 
for every 1,000 establishments, on average. Receiving credit before export support 
generates a significantly higher impact on employment than when the support is 
received simultaneously. 
Overall, the results are positive and synergies have been found, highlighting the 
importance of coordination among institutions that support SME programs. This 
overall impact should be read with caution. Nevertheless, it is illustrative of the 
overall potential impact of SME support in Brazil. 
Overall, the results are positive and 
synergies have been found, highlighting 
the importance of coordination among 
institutions that support SME programs. 
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exeCuTive summary
The study illustrates how complex evaluations using micro data can be feasible and 
can address the lack of impact assessment of these programs. Yet the evaluation has 
limitations. Data were not available on SME revenues, loan amounts, or precise 
export values, which would have allowed more refined analysis of the impact of SME 
programs on the outcomes of interest. In addition, no information was available on 
the implementation costs of the programs, so an analysis of their cost-effectiveness 
was not possible. Finally, the evaluation focuses only on manufacturing SMEs and 
does not assess the extent to which various regions benefit differently from each 
specific intervention or a combination of support.
Follow-up studies should incorporate other SME programs and should explore other 
aspects of the programs analyzed. All evaluated programs are public and provided 
for free or on a subsidized basis. A focus on program implementation and a cost-
effectiveness analysis indicate the determinants of success and would reveal the types 
of support that are more cost-effective. 
 
1Institutional and market failures prevent SMEs from reaching the necessary size to generate economic growth. SMEs suffer more than larger firms from inflexible 
regulations and standards, high registration costs, and high tax rates.
1“Head 1”: Unit bold 
48/40#1Introduction
This evaluation consists of an empirical comparative analysis 
of the various types of programs through which the Inter-
American Development Bank (IDB, or the Bank) supports small 
and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in Latin America and the 
Caribbean (LAC). The evaluation focuses on interventions in 
Brazil and SMEs in the manufacturing sector only. It does not 
evaluate Bank projects directly or compare executing agencies, 
models of interventions or financial instruments, but rather 
examines the effectiveness of Bank-supported approaches 
implemented by Brazilian institutions. It aims to draw important 
lessons about the various approaches and the effectiveness of 
these support models. 
Institutional and market failures prevent SMEs from reaching the necessary size 
to generate economic growth.1 SMEs suffer more than larger firms from inflexible 
regulations and standards, high registration costs, and high tax rates.2 At the same 
time, weak institutions and poor coordination hinder the public sector from 
providing the services that SMEs need3—for example, the shared knowledge 
and information that SME owners need to train employees and access business 
consulting,4 and the coordination of inter-firm linkages that help integrate SMEs 
into supply systems and agglomerations of larger firms so that they can export 
products and internationalize.5
Therefore, SMEs often turn involuntarily toward informality and operate at scales 
below minimum efficiency levels, underperforming in terms of average productivity, 
growth, and innovation compared to larger firms. Large enterprises in LAC are six 
times more productive than SMEs, while those in developed economies are only 1.3 
to 2.4 times more productive.6 Inefficient operational levels generate low profitability, 
and SMEs then encounter further obstacles when hiring skilled workers. Moreover, 
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SMEs experience difficulty accessing intermediate goods and raw materials since the 
characteristics of the production function prevent their suppliers from scaling down 
their services. 
Incomplete, imperfect, and asymmetric information hinders SMEs’ access to financing 
and business consulting. Since information constraints hamper banks’ risk assessment of 
SMEs, SMEs—particularly those investing in growth7 and innovation—have difficulty 
accessing credit. Because innovation projects are complex and lack appropriability, they 
are both costly and risky, thus banks require a higher premium to finance innovation 
activities.8 Consequently, SMEs are less able than large firms to invest in innovation, 
since they lack collateral and reputation and have higher risk profiles.
SME support is not immune to criticism. Many argue that small firms do not necessarily 
use resources more productively than medium and large firms (Lee et al., 2012). For 
instance, Beck et al. (2005) suggest that large enterprises are the most significant 
contributors to productivity growth since they are able to exploit economies of scale 
and more easily undertake the fixed costs associated with research and development. 
Also, larger firms have a lower mortality rate and provide more stable and higher-
quality jobs than smaller firms, and thus may be more effective in terms of poverty 
alleviation. However, SME assistance programs aim not only to help small firms create 
more jobs per unit of investment by virtue of being more labor-intensive, but also to 
generate jobs for low-skilledc workers. The objective of these programs should not 
be just to create jobs, but rather to create productive jobs, which can occur in an 
enterprise of any size, including SMEs. It has been suggested that SME programs may 
indeed boost the productivity of beneficiary firms but, in the aggregate, the effects 
would be greater if support were open to all firms regardless of their size, particularly 
companies in the formal sector.9
Nevertheless, a substantial share of the economic development literature suggests that 
well-targeted policies aimed at promoting SMEs can lead to positive development 
outcomes.10 SMEs are a fundamental part of the economic fabric in developing countries. 
In LAC, SMEs account for nearly 99% of firms and 67% of employment.11 They generate 
employment and income for about 50% of the formal workforce in the manufacturing 
sector and contribute to most new jobs and revenue growth in the region.12 In particular, 
export-oriented and high-tech SMEs have several spillover effects and a positive impact 
on job creation.13 The challenge is to continuously increase the productivity of the SME 
sector to allow it to effectively contribute to economic development.
A. bAnk suPPort to smes
Several LAC countries have adopted public policies to promote SMEs through a 
number of development agencies.14 Multilateral organizations—the IDB Group, 
World Bank, African Development Bank, and UNIDO—have also provided extensive 
support for SMEs in developing countries.15 
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The Bank has ample experience supporting SME interventions in LAC countries 
through sovereign- and non-sovereign-guaranteed lending and technical cooperation. 
The IDB post-realignment portfolio (2006-2013) supporting SMEs consists of 155 
sovereign- and non-sovereign-guaranteed operations amounting to US$5.7 billion, 
which represents nearly 9% of the IDB’s portfolio and 34% of its total private sector 
development (PSD) lending.16 
Support to the SME sector is stressed in various Bank strategies and guidelines. For 
instance, the Bank’s Institutions for Growth and Social Welfare Strategy (GN-473-2) 
states that SME interventions aim to increase productivity. The SME Guidelines 
(IDB, 2009-OP-580-2) state that SMEs are important for job creation, productivity 
gains, and long-term growth in LAC. They indicate that the IDB’s strategic support 
to SMEs focuses on expanding access to finance, improving the business climate, 
increasing formalization, and improving SME development programs and policies.17 
The Bank has responded with various types of interventions to address market failures 
and support the development of SMEs across LAC. Figure 1 identifies the Bank’s main 
approaches to support SMEs in Brazil and links the motivation for the interventions 
with expected outputs, outcomes, and impacts. The types of interventions in Figure 1 
do not include all SME interventions supported by the IDB in LAC; the figure only 
considers the Bank’s intervention types in Brazil and thus omits interventions aimed at 
addressing job training and formalization.18
Figure 1: 
IDB Approaches to SME Support
 
Source: OVE’s elaboration.
4 A Comparative Analysis of IDB Approaches Supporting SMEs: Assessing Results in the Brazilian Manufacturing Sector
•	 Credit. Adverse selection and moral hazard in credit markets generate financial 
constraints that affect SME activities.19 Potential lenders attribute a high risk 
of default to SMEs—which often lack credit history, adequate collateral, 
and expertise to produce sophisticated financial statements—and thus deny 
them credit.20 These constraints affect the SMEs’ investment capacity as well 
as their survival throughout the business cycle.21 Thus, a significant number of 
interventions have been designed to alleviate credit constraints and provide SMEs 
with the capital they need to reach their full potential.22 For example, credit 
guarantee schemes are a risk transfer mechanism commonly used to overcome the 
absence of adequate collateral—they reduce the lender’s credit risk by reducing 
the financial loss the financial institution would suffer if the SME defaults.
•	 Business consulting.23 SMEs often lack adequate information on basic 
regulations, environmental management, and business management. Projects 
focused on business consulting are based on the idea that skills improve 
business performance, firm growth, and ultimately firm productivity.24 
•	 Agglomeration. Agglomeration refers to SME support programs that 
are based on the idea that individual firms can benefit from productive 
associations with others, and they provide a localized network of specialized 
organizations, services, and knowledge.25 These projects aim to overcome 
coordination failures that prevent SMEs from capturing such externalities.26 
The concept of agglomeration has been widely adopted as a policy tool for 
local economic development programs, which explains the support given 
by development agencies in various countries—Brazil, South Korea, Japan, 
France, and many others.27
•	 Innovation. Social returns to innovation exceed private returns implying 
that investors do not reap all the benefits of the investment. Asymmetry of 
information hampers assessment of project cost-benefit analysis, reducing the 
incentive to introduce innovation. Innovation projects also raise coordination 
problems since they depend on complementary investments such as human 
capital, technological infrastructure and knowledge. In turn, this knowledge 
is usually tacitly reached through interaction among market and non-market 
institutions.28 Since innovation is the main driver of economic progress and 
has intangible and positive knowledge spillover effects, the role of public policy 
is to address market and coordination failures in order to facilitate investment 
in knowledge generation and to encourage innovation.29 Policy instruments 
vary and include financing science and research, particularly for product 
differentiation and process innovation, and funding to start new businesses.30
•	 Exports. The programs that support export promotion are justified as interventions 
that correct market failures, such as information externalities,31  and help SMEs 
overcome the obstacles to exporting. SMEs’ lack of cross-border knowledge on 
51 inTroduCTion
markets, suppliers, and technologies is a barrier for their access to international 
markets.32 Greenaway and Kneller (2007) argue that a “learning by exporting” 
process for SMEs engaged in export activities leads them to innovate and be more 
productive. The hypothesis is that the increased competition in foreign markets 
may provide information to SMEs on new products and processes, thereby 
reducing costs and improving quality. Likewise, firms exposed to new markets 
can scale up their production, but they also need to be more efficient and increase 
their investments in innovation to tackle external competitors.
These types of interventions aim to address different market failures and are likely to 
produce different results in the short and medium term. While credit programs targeted 
at working capital may have short-term effects on growth and employment, innovation 
programs may take up to five years to show effects on these same outcomes, although 
they are expected to present short-term results in terms of investment in innovation 
activities (Crespi at al., 2011). Also, several interventions, such as agglomeration, exports 
and innovation, explicitly seek to generate positive spillover effects and produce indirect 
benefits to other agents that are not participating in these programs.
Table 1 shows the IDB’s operations in Brazil that are aimed at supporting SMEs, 
breaking them down by type of approach. 
b. Assessing the eFFectiveness oF sme suPPort models
There have been significant challenges in extracting lessons from the initiatives 
implemented both worldwide and in LAC to support SMEs. First, there is no universal 
definition for SME (see Box 1). This analysis uses the European Union criterion for 
the definition of SMEs—that is, firms with at least one employee and fewer than 250 
employees are considered SMEs. Second, it is difficult to analyze the impacts of each 
individual intervention, since interventions may be implemented simultaneously. 
Finally, there is little coordination among the vast number of programs for SMEs, and 
numerous experiences have not been assessed or had lessons extracted from them.33
Significant efforts have been made to evaluate the effectiveness of various individual 
support approaches and their spillovers, but little is known about whether and how 
SME-oriented interventions reinforce each other. The main objective of this evaluation 
is to provide rigorous evidence of impacts from different SME support models that 
the IDB has used.
The Bank has undertaken a range of studies assessing the effectiveness of SME support 
approaches. Examples of evaluated SME support approaches include access to finance 
(De Negri et al. 2011; Eslava et al., 2012), clusters (Garone et al., 2012), value chains 
(Arraiz et al., 2012), innovation (Chudnovsky et al., 2006; Crespi and Pluvia, 2010; 
Alvarez et al., 2011; and Castillo et al., 2013a and 2014), and export promotion 
(Volpe and Carballo, 2010a and 2010b; Volpe et al., 2010). In addition, recent 
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efforts have focused on measuring the spillover effects of innovation policies through 
labor mobility.34 In general, these studies have documented evidence that support to 
SMEs has positive impacts on employment, exports, wages and productivity. This is 
consistent with the results of studies conducted outside the Bank.35 
Source: IDB Portfolio of Brazil Operations 2006- 2013
Table 1. Approaches to SME Support: IDB Operations in Brazil (2006-2013)
Note: *Technical Cooperation/Grant
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Box 1. The Classification of SMEs
In the literature, the classification of SMEs varies (Ayyagari et al., 2007). The 
most common criterion—used, for example, by the European Union—is based on 
employment information. Several authors in the labor economic literature—such as 
Beck et al. (2005) and Moscarini and Postel-Vinay (2009)—and the World Bank 
classify SMEs as having fewer than 250 employees.
The IDB Group has defined guidelines to classify firm size as micro, small, medium, and 
large (see Annex I, OP-580-2, and CII/GP-15-10). These guidelines consider different 
parameters for corporate and financial intermediaries’ operations. For corporate, enterprise 
size is defined in terms of assets, revenues, and number of employees, and for financial 
intermediaries, enterprise size is defined by the size of operations with end-beneficiaries. 
OVE adopted the cut-off of 250 employees for the definition of SMEs for two 
reasons: (i) the possibility of validation of the results based on the literature, and  
(ii) the need for a narrower classification than the IDB Group, whose criteria may 
imply classifying all enterprises in the country as SMEs.
The previous studies focus mainly on individual support approaches and do not 
provide a comparative analysis of the impacts of different types of approaches within a 
single study.36 Therefore, they do not provide evidence about the differential intensity 
and timing of relative impacts among alternative policies and examine whether the 
confluence of different treatments results in synergies between them.37
Accordingly, the Bank is working to evaluate the relative effectiveness of innovation 
and export promotion policies in a multitreatment setting.38 Initial findings show 
positive synergies between these two types of policies. Therefore, this evaluation 
complements previous and ongoing work by conducting a comparative analysis of the 
SME approaches’ impacts on outcomes of interest.
2SMEs contribute up to 20% of Brazil’s GDP, and more than 30% of Brazilians aged 18-64 are involved in some form of entrepreneurship.
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Brazil classifies firms by size for programs to foster working 
capital investments, exports, and innovation efforts under 
special rates and conditions. As in other countries, the 
criteria are not applied consistently. By law, the criterion 
for classifying a company in a particular category is its 
annual turnover thresholds.39 However, only firms classified 
as SMEs by the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) 
can apply for subsidized credit to foster exports. SEBRAE 
(Brazilian Small Business Support Service) added “number 
of employees” to define SMEs that are eligible to receive 
its support.40 The Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES) 
uses annual gross income to define eligibility for its SME 
programs. As mentioned above, OVE uses the European 
Union criterion for the definition of SMEs: firms with up to 
249 employees are considered SMEs.
A. the imPortAnce oF smes For the brAziliAn 
economy
SMEs contribute up to 20% of Brazil’s GDP, and more than 30% of Brazilians 
aged 18-64 are involved in some form of entrepreneurship.41 OVE estimates that 
micro, small, and medium businesses together represent 99.4% of total firms, 
contributing to 54% of total formal employment in the country and to nearly half 
(43%) of total wages in the Brazilian economy (see Figure 2).
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Among the country’s formal SMEs, 81% are engaged in the retail and service sector—
that is, nearly 2.6 million establishments employing 25.5 million people. Agriculture 
accounts for 10% of the formal SMEs, with 326,045 establishments that employ 
1.04 million people. Manufacturing accounts for 9% of total SMEs as well as of total 
Brazilian firms, with 293,686 establishments that employ 4.2 million people. The 
SMEs in manufacturing account for 54% of total employment in the sector.
 
SMEs (like large corporations) are concentrated in Brazil’s southeastern region (see 
Figure 3), which offers wider market variety, better urban infrastructure, a more 
qualified workforce, and a larger consumer market (43% of the country’s population 
lives in the southeastern region).
Figure 2: 
Share of Firms, Employees and 
Wages, by Firm Size
 
Source: OVE estimates, based on Labor 
Ministry database.
Figure 3: 
Distribution of SMEs 
among Brazilian Regions
 
Source: OVE estimates based 
 on Ministry of Labor database.
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OVE’s analysis only involves SMEs in the field of manufacturing.42 Although SMEs 
in agriculture and retail and services represent a large share of employment, OVE 
decided not to include them in the analysis because the quality of the data is not as 
high for these sectors and the assessment would be much more time-consuming. A 
future analysis could assess the impact of SME programs within these sectors.
b. the chAllenges FAcing brAziliAn smes
Brazilian SMEs cope with some of the same issues that face SMEs worldwide; however, 
there are a few challenges that particularly hinder their impact on the economy. Although 
SMEs provide the vast majority of jobs nationwide, they deal with market and institutional 
failures that prevent them from reaching an optimal size to generate economic growth. 
•	 Access to Finance. Reducing the cost of borrowing and improving SMEs’ 
access to finance is a persistent concern in improving the competitiveness of 
the Brazilian economy. Credit constraints are particularly severe for SMEs, 
apart from the lengthy time periods associated with processing a loan (more 
than six months in some cases).43 The ratio of credit to SMEs as a percentage 
of total credit (12.2%) is lower than the contribution from SMEs to the 
country’s GDP (20%). Although Brazil is not far behind the LAC average 
(12.39%) in this area, it is merely half of the OECD average (25.54%).44
•	 Cost of Doing Business. Since Brazil has vast regional disparities in terms of 
human resources, trade logistics and capital, the cost of doing business varies 
across states.45 Some states have already started to simplify procedures for 
registering a business, including establishing one-stop shops where multiple 
resources and services are offered; but in most cases, the process remains 
lengthy and costly. It takes 108 days to start a business in Brazil, whereas the 
average for the LAC region is only 36 days. SMEs also deal with cumbersome 
tax regimes. Even after tax simplification measures,46 medium-sized Brazilian 
firms spend 2,600 hours per year filing taxes—over twice as long as the next 
slowest country and nearly 10 times the average.47
•	 Trade Barriers. Brazil ranks lower than most major countries on the quality 
of its hard infrastructure.48 Logistics and bureaucracy create barriers to trade 
and foreign investment, causing a negative impact on the national economy, 
particularly on employment rates and economic growth. Brazil ranks 124 out 
of 189 economies worldwide in terms of trading across borders.49  
•	 Backlog in Issuance of Patents and Trademarks. There is a backlog in patent 
processing and trademark registration that leads to business uncertainty and 
affects firms’ innovation efforts. For instance, Brazilian firms take nearly twice 
as long as American firms to obtain their patents and trademarks from the 
National Institute of Intellectual Property (INPI).50
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c. institutionAl FrAmework For sme suPPort
Implementing policies geared toward promoting SMEs is a relatively recent 
phenomenon in Brazil. The starting point was the approval of SME legislation in 
the New Constitution in 1988, although the legal framework was not implemented 
until 1996.51 It established a differentiated tax regime,52 federal funds (see Box 2) 
and special credit programs for SMEs. Fiscal resources were allocated to regional and 
national public banks, national agencies, and nonprofit organizations to fund SME 
support programs by financing working capital investments, exports, and innovation 
efforts under special rates and conditions (see Figure 4).
Box 2. Public Funds for SME Support
Fund for Workers’ Assistance. The 1988 Constitution created the Fund for Workers’ 
Assistance (FAT), whose resources come from two employer tax contributions for 
social security programs. FAT is linked to the Ministry of Labor and managed by a 
Tripartite Council comprising employees, employers, and the federal government. 
One important social program funded by FAT is the Employment and Income 
Generation Program (PROGER). PROGER is implemented in rural and urban areas 
and one of its goals is to support SMEs through subsidized credit. The PROGER 
agents are Bank of Brazil (BB) and the Federal Savings Bank (CEF), which have 
national coverage, and the regional development banks, Amazon Bank (BASA) and 
Northeast Bank of Brazil (BNB). The main public banking institutions—BNDES, 
BB, BNB, and CEF —partnered amongst themselves to adopt initiatives aimed 
at financing the working capital needs of SMEs agglomerated in value chains. As 
a second-tier bank, BNDES provides the resources to these banks, which in turn 
provide financing to SMEs in value chains. 
The Constitution states that 40% of the FAT resources should be invested in BNDES 
for an indefinite term. BNDES absorbs the risks of the operations implemented with 
FAT resources and pays regular interest on them at a long-term interest rate. BNDES 
provides credit support to SMEs through three main programs. The first program, 
the BNDES Card, targets SMEs exclusively by enabling preapproved, automated 
credit to finance SME productive investments. The other two programs finance firms 
regardless of their size: The program for Machinery and Equipment Financing, known 
as FINAME, provides a long-term program of financing for goods and services, and 
BNDES Automatic finances investment projects under US$4.4 million.
Constitutional Funds. The Constitutional Funds of the Northern and Northeastern 
Regions, created in 1989, are major resources that BASA and BNB allocate to 
regional programs in the country’s northern and northeastern region, respectively. 
The Fund for the Central-Western Region was created around the same time, and its 
agent is Bank of Brazil. The funds’ resources mainly come from 3% of income tax 
and industrial products tax, and finance micro, small, and medium-sized rural and 
urban enterprises. The Ministry of National Integration defines the guidelines and 
priorities for investments and for monitoring and evaluating the programs financed 
by the funds.
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During the early 2000s, federal government policies aimed at fostering competitiveness 
in Brazilian industries emphasized the role of SMEs.53 These policies envisaged a 
new regulatory framework and created institutions to strengthen the link between 
government policies and business strategies: the National Council of Industrial 
Development and the Brazilian Agency of Industrial Development (ABDI), which 
is directly subordinated to the President of the Republic, and the SME Secretariat.54 
The Brazilian Trade and Investment Promotion Agency (APEX) was created in 2003 
with the goal of promoting exports of goods and services and opening Brazilian 
companies to external markets. It is responsible for coordinating and implementing 
export promotion policies for Brazilian goods and services and for attracting foreign 
direct investment. APEX focuses particularly on activities that increase SMEs’ exports 
and create jobs, although it serves companies of all sizes.55
National Fund for Scientific and Technological Development (FNDCT). Created by 
presidential decree in 1969 and ratified by law in 1991, FNDCT aggregates revenues 
from 15 sectoral funds (13 sectoral and 2 cross-sectoral funds). The FNDCT governing 
body, which is chaired by the Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation, 
channels funds to finance firm strategies focused on innovation, regardless of their size. 
The Brazilian Innovation Agency (FINEP), which is the public agency responsible for 
managing and applying FNDCT resources, is subordinate to the Ministry of Science, 
Technology and Innovation and also receives resources from FAT. It addresses SME 
innovation efforts through subsidized and nonreimbursable programs and venture 
capital investments, working in partnership with institutions such as the Multilateral 
Investment Fund, SEBRAE, Petrobras Social Security Foundation, the National 
Council for Scientific and Technological Development, the Society for Promoting 
the Excellence of Brazilian Software, and the São Paulo Stock Exchange. FINEP also 
promotes SME innovation activities through the Firm Research and Technological 
Innovation Program, known as PAPPE, which is implemented at the state level.
Figure 4: 
Main Federal Support to 
Manufacturing SMEs
 
Source: OVE’s elaboration
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Brazilian institutions historically collaborate with one another when implementing their 
SME support programs. For example, SEBRAE, which is the main contributor to SME 
support programs in Brazil,56 collaborates with both BNDES and FINEP in venture 
capital and private equity funds aimed at fostering innovative start-ups, and with APEX 
in export promotion.
These institutions adopt measures to improve the overall business climate and to create 
a more propitious environment for technology development. The policies envisage 
eliminating taxes on investments and exports, simplifying measures to start up and close 
companies, and investing in INPI to simplify procedures and accelerate the registration 
of a patent or trademark. The National Institute of Metrology, Quality and Technology 
(INMETRO) offers information on the requirements and conformity assessment 
procedures established by foreign imports and aims to foster instruments of basic industrial 
technology to promote growth and technological innovation, increase competitiveness, 
and create a favorable environment for scientific and industrial development.
d. chArActeristics oF the evAluAted ProgrAms
Seven agencies established partnerships with OVE to conduct an impact evaluation of 
their programs: ABDI, APEX, BNB, BNDES, FINEP, INMETRO and SEBRAE. The 
availability of their datasets allows for the assessment of different types and combination 
of types of SME support: credit, business consulting, innovation, export promotion, 
and agglomeration.
1. Credit
While BNDES and BNB provide financing, SEBRAE provides guarantees and 
assistance for SMEs to access financial lines. Most of the programs are demand-driven. 
For BNDES and SEBRAE programs, SMEs can submit their applications online.
•	 BNDES Card. BNDES Card is a preapproved line of credit that Brazilian 
SMEs can use to purchase locally manufactured goods, industrial inputs, 
and services.57 BNDES accredits Brazilian financial institutions to issue the 
card. These financial institutions are responsible for the selection, credit risk 
analysis, and credit limit for each SME that applies for a card. Eligible SMEs 
should have gross annual revenues of up to US$40 million and must meet 
their fiscal and social obligations. Beneficiaries of the BNDES Card can only 
purchase products and services through suppliers registered and authorized 
by the BNDES and can amortize their debt through up to 48 fixed and equal 
monthly installments.
•	 BNB lending. As the government’s primary financing agent in the country’s 
northeastern region, BNB has been lending to micro, small, and medium-
sized enterprises since it started its operations in 1954, two years after its 
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foundation. BNB’s traditional financial services include investment solutions, 
such as savings accounts and certificates of deposit, as well as checking 
accounts, insurance products, and bill collection services.58
•	 SEBRAE projects. SEBRAE structures projects in which companies are 
advised on how to use credit from financial institutions. SEBRAE also 
promotes loan guarantee schemes and contributes to the funds that act as 
loan guarantors. 
2. Business Consulting
SEBRAE offers business consulting, which is often demand-driven, to train 
managers, executives, and advisors of family businesses, and it helps families launch 
their startups. Consulting may be provided to individual SMEs or to small groups 
of SMEs, and is either free or subsidized by SEBRAE. It focuses on issues such 
as management, professionalism, and corporate governance. SEBRAE provides 
training through distance learning courses, its website, call center support, television 
programs, radio programs, technical consultancies, courses, workshops, business 
events, and business trips. 
3. Innovation
FINEP supports innovation by providing loans and nonreimbursable financial 
support. It selects its beneficiaries through public calls for proposals, invitation letters, 
and bids. Three financial products are subject to evaluation in this report.
•	 Economic Subvention. The Economic Subvention program provides 
nonreimbursable financial support to share the costs and risks inherent in 
innovation activities. Grants have been awarded through tenders launched 
annually since 2006 and made available on FINEP’s website. 
• Zero Interest.  The Zero Interest program, created at the end of 2005, provides 
interest-free loans, indexed by inflation, to SMEs with annual revenues under 
US$4,706,100. The program is demand-driven and is implemented through 
partnerships with research institutions, business associations, and industrial 
chambers that prequalify SMEs’ proposals. FINEP provides final approval, 
and the program requires 20% in guarantees from SME owners.59
•	 Reimbursable. The Reimbursable credit line, which FINEP has been 
implementing since its foundation, focuses on medium and large 
enterprises, preferably in agglomerations, that are pursuing innovative 
efforts to increase competitiveness. The firms apply online. Unlike the Zero 
Interest program, Reimbursable requires real guarantees from firms that 
apply for the program.
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SEBRAE develops products in areas such as certification, technology transfer programs, 
incubators, and product development. It provides improved access to innovation 
and technology through a range of services: technical consultancies, design clinics, 
environmental management, business incubators, science and technology parks, 
innovation agents, energy efficiency, certification, and Metrology Bonus.60
4. Exports
APEX, SEBRAE, ABDI, and INMETRO provided data from SME beneficiaries on 
their export promotion programs.
•	 APEX offers support by creating export consortiums, trade promotion 
in international business fairs, market research, trademark development, 
and trade information. APEX organizes export groups that comprise 
approximately 15 companies each. It works in partnership with private 
sector associations to provide services such as market intelligence, 
business capacity building, trade and image promotion, and development 
of internationalization strategies. Trade promotion activities include 
participation in trade missions and international trade fairs, and visits of 
foreign buyers to Brazil. APEX supports export promotion by cofinancing 
these activities for up to 85% of the total value.
Since the early 2000s, federal government 
policies aimed at fostering competitiveness 
in Brazilian industries emphasized the role 
of SMEs.
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•	 SEBRAE promotes partially or fully funded activities through which firms 
can explore external markets: participation in export fairs, courses on how 
to export, and certifications that are recognized internationally and that help 
boost exports. 
•	 ABDI was the counterpart of a technical cooperation funded by the European 
Union to support the international insertion of Brazilian SMEs. Implemented 
from 2008 to 2012, the project consisted of training activities, research, and 
access to high-tech equipment to promote cooperation between Brazilian 
and European institutions. The project was implemented in partnership with 
several Brazilian agencies and institutions—for example, the Foreign Trade 
Chamber of the Ministry of Development, Industry and Trade and regional 
SEBRAE offices—which selected the SME beneficiaries.
•	 INMETRO’s Export Alert offers free information on technical requirements 
and conformity assessment procedures established by foreign importers. The 
information is provided upon request online.
5. Agglomeration
SEBRAE provides general support to agglomeration stakeholders through diagnostic 
studies, design of action plans, specific courses, trips to business fairs and certifications. 
The overall goal is to reinforce and build up cooperation and governance among the 
public and private sectors. 
3The evaluation assesses how various SME interventions and various combinations of these interventions affect employment, real wages, exports-value range, and patent 
and trademark registration in Brazil.
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48/40#3Evaluation Design
The evaluation assesses the effectiveness of various types of 
SME interventions implemented by Brazilian institutions 
and supported by the Bank in the LAC region. The results 
are assessed for SMEs in the manufacturing sector only. The 
specific evaluation questions are as follows: 
•	 How do various SME interventions and various combinations of these 
interventions affect employment, real wages, exports-value range, and patent 
and trademark registration in Brazil?
•	 To what extent do the duration and sequencing of SME interventions 
influence their impact on employment, real wages, exports-value range, and 
patent and trademark registration in Brazil? 
A. outcomes oF interest And dAtA sources
The main outcomes of interest are employment, real wages, exports-value range, 
and patent and trademark registration. Productivity is the common expected 
impact shared by all types of interventions, however, the available information 
does not allow for calculating total factor productivity. Total employment at the 
establishment level serves as a proxy for establishment size, allowing an analysis 
of whether SME support affects employment generation. OVE also assessed the 
effects of SME support on real wages, exports-value range and innovation. 
OVE negotiated agreements with Brazilian institutions to access their datasets.  
•	 Annual Social Information Report (RAIS). The RAIS dataset of the 
Ministry of Labor provides annual information about employees and 
establishments, including employment and wages.61 This dataset covers 
all formal employment and establishments in Brazil and provides detailed 
information about establishments (activity, size, age, and geographic 
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location, from municipality to macro-region level) and employees (gender, 
level of education, declared hours worked, occupation, type of formal 
contract, nationality, admission, and redundancy data). RAIS regulates 
the concession of the Salary Bonus, the minimum-wage supplement 
program.62 If an establishment fails to report the information required 
by RAIS, it faces automatic fines that are proportional to the size of its 
workforce and the length of the delay. Since the payment of the annual wage 
supplement is based exclusively on the RAIS dataset and fines are imposed 
for misreporting, employers and workers have strong incentives to comply 
with the requirements. The Ministry of Labor estimates that around 97% of 
all formal workers in Brazil are covered by RAIS. In 2001, RAIS comprised 
approximately 26 million workers and 2 million establishments, and in 2012, 
47.5 million workers and 3.6 million establishments. Establishments have 
a unique identification number (CNPJ) that allows them to be identified 
across other databases used for the analysis. OVE was granted access to RAIS’s 
microdata from 2001 to 2012. 63 
•	 Dataset of patents and trademarks. INPI provided a list of establishments 
that filed patent and/or trademark applications from 2003 onward. OVE used 
it to measure the effect of SME programs on innovation. Due to the backlog 
in patent processing and trademark registration, OVE used the “application” 
for patents and trademarks as a proxy for innovation.
•	 SECEX dataset. SECEX provided a list of establishments that export and 
import, which OVE used to measure the effect of SME programs on the 
likelihood to export. As the export data are available by value range, OVE 
estimates the program effects by assuming that all establishments located in 
a given value range export the same average value. The data also contain the 
establishments’ CNPJs, which can be linked to RAIS and the administrative 
datasets of program beneficiaries described above. SECEX microdata are 
available from 2001 onward.64 
b. evAluAtion methodology
1. General Strategy
The evaluation uses quantitative methods to assess the impact on direct beneficiaries 
of the major SME support programs implemented in Brazil from 2003 to 2012.65 The 
fact that the evaluation covers SMEs across the entire manufacturing sector brings 
external validity to the estimation. It analyzes whether establishments that received 
SME support—credit, agglomeration, innovation, exports, and business consulting—
performed better in terms of outcomes of interest (employment, real wages, exports-
value range, and patent and trademark registration) than comparable establishments 
that did not receive support.
21
3 evaluaTion design
Measuring the causal impacts of program participation on outcomes of interest using 
non-experimental data is not trivial in the context of various simultaneous treatments. 
The definition of causality is based on the concept of counterfactual—that is, the 
outcomes that would have materialized if the treated establishments had not been 
treated. While counterfactual causality is very intuitive, it is impossible to observe.66  
In the absence of random assignment, an evaluation strategy should overcome 
selection bias by constructing a counterfactual.67 These challenges rise since even prior 
to the treatment, program beneficiaries differ from nonparticipants in observable 
and unobservable ways. While observable factors (region, activity, size, age, and 
education) can be controlled for in a regression framework, the unobservable factors 
(entrepreneurial behavior, management skills, etc.) cannot. Yet these ex-ante differences 
between beneficiaries and nonparticipants can explain their participation or non-
participation in the program. Also, the time-series dimension of the panel data creates 
correlation between periods and can affect the independence of the establishment’s 
variables over time, thus biasing the estimation coefficients. For instance, the fact that 
one establishment participated in the program in the past may affect the probability 
that other establishments will receive the same or another treatment.
Benefiting from the availability of a panel dataset with a large number of establishments, 
OVE adopted the fixed-effects (FE) model combined with propensity-score matching 
(PSM) techniques.68 The aim was to guarantee that the estimations compare control 
and treated groups that are similar enough to mitigate omitted variable bias—that is, 
a bias arising from unobserved and uncontrolled differences between these two groups 
(see Annex III for the model specification). 
The FE model provides a means of controlling for omitted variable bias. In an FE 
model, the assumption is that establishments may have individual unobserved 
characteristics (omitted variables) that may be time-invariant or “fixed.” For instance, 
individual establishments’ business practices or cultural factors have the same effects 
on outcomes, such as real wages or employment, over time.69 
The assumptions behind the FE model are more credible when treated and control 
establishments exhibit the same time trends before the programs, and the establishments 
are more similar in these two groups.70 OVE analyzed the trends in four outcomes 
(employment, real wage, exports-value range, and patent and trademark registration) 
before the start of the interventions between treatment and control groups to provide 
evidence that differences between them are statistically indistinguishable from zero.
OVE applied the PSM technique to construct a control group.71 The PSM 
computes treated and non-treated groups that differ only with respect to treatment 
but otherwise have the same observed characteristics. PSM defines the probability of 
each establishment’s participation in the evaluated programs given a set of explanatory 
variables (age, education, and activity) before the treatment.72 RAIS does not provide a 
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rich array of variables to use in the PSM. Given data constraints, OVE tested different 
PSM, consistently including age and education in the specification and altering the 
use of geographical and sector dummies.73
OVE constructed three alternative control groups as a match for the treated 
establishments to provide robustness checks to the estimations.74 First, the control 
group comprised all the untreated establishments. Second, OVE restricted the control 
group to firms in the region of common support.75 Finally, OVE constructed a control 
group by using the nearest neighbor matching technique to constrain the sample and 
stratification regression for matching.76 
OVE matched treated and non-treated units using a propensity score for each unit 
that ranges from zero (no probability of participation) to unity (high probability of 
participation). Then, OVE divided the establishments into blocks according to the 
stratification of the propensity score at the year 2001 and ran the FE model using 
these blocks as controls.77 
The large size of the database allowed OVE to address the problem of attrition rate bias 
(loss of participants).78 The main issue is that attrition is likely to depend on characteristics 
such as education and age, biasing the panel data estimations. In this particular database, 
the shrinkage in the number of establishments along the panel may not only be the 
result of a downward bias (increase in the SME death rate) but also of an upward bias 
(reclassification of the SMEs that exceeded the upper threshold of the SME definition). To 
provide results that are not affected by these effects, OVE only tracked the establishments 
that appear along the entire panel period, between 2001 and 2012. The resulting loss 
of observations does not affect the robustness of the results or the representativeness of 
the sample. OVE tested this by comparing the means of both balanced and unbalanced 
samples using simple t-tests.79 The difference between balanced and unbalanced panels 
is that in the former, all establishments are observed across all years. The tests show that 
balanced and unbalanced panels are similar for wage and employment while they are 
significantly unequal for exports-value and patent and trademark registration outcomes.80 
The evaluation results are an average for the whole country. Every model was run 
controlling for the geographical location of the establishment—that is, dummies 
were used for the 26 states and the federal district. However, the evaluation design 
does not rule out the possibility of differences in impact due to establishment 
location. Thus, a future analysis could assess the extent to which various regions 
benefit differently from individual interventions or a combination of support. A 
distribution of the establishments covered by the evaluation sample shows that 75% 
of them are concentrated on the southern and southeastern regions of the country.
OVE conducted two additional robustness tests. First, OVE built propensity scores 
using 2002 as a baseline (instead of 2001) while including the lagged values of real 
wages and effective employment (2001 values) as inputs. To assess the impact of the 
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programs, the variation in the outcomes should not take place before the firms are 
treated; therefore, OVE controlled for pre-treatment trends in the outcomes. As long 
as the results are similar with or without lagged outcomes in the PSM, the hypothesis 
of similar trends between control and treatment groups cannot be rejected.81 In 
addition, as a second exercise, OVE tested the sensibility of the results when only 
smaller firms (fewer than 51 employees) and larger firms (more than 50 employees 
and fewer than 250) are considered. See Annex VIII for a presentation of the results 
of both robustness estimations.
2. Summary Statistics of Treated and Control Groups
As mentioned above, OVE constructed three alternative control groups to provide 
robustness checks to the estimations, using 2001 as the baseline. Table 2 shows the 
characteristics of the treated group with the three alternative control groups—universe 
of non-treated, common support, and neighbor—for all treatments. In general, the 
treated establishments have more employees than the control groups, while they are 
even in terms of the average age and education of their employees. For the sake of 
illustration, this section presents the credit treatment only.
First, the control group comprised all the untreated establishments (“non-treated group” 
in the second column). For instance, the average monthly wage in establishments 
exposed to credit treatment was US$165.96 as opposed to an average monthly wage 
of US$187.23 in the group of establishments that did not receive credit support. 
This comparison is provided for outcome and explanatory variables across all types of 
interventions.
Second, OVE restricted the counterfactual group to the common support group—that 
is, only the establishments that are in the range within the overlap of the distribution 
of the propensity score for the treatment and control group (“region of common-
support” in the third column). This procedure eliminates from the sample non-treated 
establishments that have very different probabilities of being treated, comparing only 
treated and non-treated establishments with more similar probabilities of being treated. 
The table shows that the common support group has almost the same observations 
(29,426 instead of 29,429) and is overall very similar to the full untreated set of 
establishments.82 
Finally, OVE restricted the common support group by using nearest neighbor matching 
(“nearest neighbor group” in the fourth column).83 For the establishments that 
received credit, the average wage of the nearest neighbor control group (US$169.05) 
is the most similar to the value of treated establishments (US$165.96).
Table 2 shows that while the control groups appear to be similar in the covariates 
age and education and in the outcome wages, the nearest neighbor group comprises 
establishments that are smaller on average in terms of number of employees.84 
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Alternative PSM exercises were performed, and the estimations based on alternative 
control groups provide similar qualitative results. Nevertheless, the database does not 
have many alternative variables to be used in the PSM.85
Table 2.  Firm Characteristics for Treated and Control Groups (2001)
Credit treatment
Employment
Wages
Average years of schooling
Average age
Export range
Patents & trademarks
Observations
Treated 
group
16.70244
370.2738
7.379897
30.42501
0.106565
0.00188
6916
Non-treated 
group
16.05611**
417.7371***
7.218393***
31.64098***
0.096096*
0.001393
29429
Region of  
common support
16.05769**
417.7471***
7.218586***
31.63978***
0.096106*
0.001393
29426
Nearest 
neighbor group
10.44568***
377.1979
7.469587***
30.31922
0.057128***
0.001116
9855
Agglomeration treatment
Employment
Wages
Average years of schooling
Average age
Export range
Patents & trademarks
Observations
Treated 
group
20.92902
358.1679
6.619537
31.23284
0.089209
0.001439
695
Non-treated 
group
16.05611***
417.7371***
7.218393***
31.64098**
0.096096
0.001393
29429
Region of  
common support
16.10159***
406.4216***
7.187844***
31.59286*
0.095504
0.001372
29161
Nearest 
neighbor group
8.75264***
341.4263
7.368907***
30.19931***
0.051067**
0
1547
Export treatment
Employment
Wages
Average years of schooling
Average age
Export range
Patents & trademarks
Observations
Treated 
group
28.54677
469.7073
7.608477
31.66321
0.4211618
0.0082988
964
Non-treated 
group
16.05611***
417.7371***
7.218393***
31.64098
0.0960957***
0.0013932**
29429
Region of  
common support
16.12223***
417.005***
7.2396***
31.63734
0.0966342***
0.001401**
29265
Nearest 
neighbor group
7.77509***
379.1525***
7.898422***
30.18283***
0.0515371***
0.0013562**
2212
Innovation treatment
Employment
Wages
Average years of schooling
Average age
Export range
Patents & trademarks
Observations
Treated 
group
30.79773
650.8791
9.195464
30.9484
0.3398058
0.038835
103
Non-treated 
group
16.05611**
417.7371***
7.218393***
31.64098
0.0960957***
0.0013932*
29429
Region of  
common support
16.15079***
418.5299***
7.270086***
31.58663
0.0966094***
0.0014056*
29169
Nearest 
neighbor group
7.399535***
409.3457***
8.943388
27.86481***
0.087108***
0.0034843*
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3 evaluaTion design
Annex IV shows the similarities in trends and distributions between treated and control 
groups. The Kernel Density Charts display the pretreatment performance trends prior to 
2003. As mentioned above, the specification strategy only demands parallel preexisting 
trends, relaxing the assumption of similarity in levels between control and treatment groups 
as described in Table 2.86 As long as the “before-treatment” trends in outcomes are parallel and 
the unobservable factors explaining differences between control and treated establishments 
are time-invariant, the FE model consistently captures the impact of SME support. OVE 
complemented this graphical analysis by testing the significance of “anticipatory” effects 
and by adding a pre-treatment control specification. For all the cases, the estimates of 
anticipatory effect are either negative or non-significantly different from zero. 
3. Combination of Treatments
OVE conducted an impact assessment of four combinations of programs, taking 
credit as a reference and adding each of the other programs: credit plus agglomeration, 
innovation, exports value, and business consulting. Positive correlations between 
support combinations and outcomes would reveal that although credit support may help 
establishments conduct daily operations by providing working capital, only additional 
support such as agglomeration, innovation and exports-value may boost productivity.
OVE applied the same estimation technique used for single treatments. The only 
difference was that OVE selected the establishments that received credit as a control 
group. Then, OVE compared those establishments that received a combination (treated 
group) with the control group.
OVE provides further evidence on whether the sequencing of different interventions has 
implications on SME performance. In particular, the evaluation assesses whether credit and 
each of the other treatments show differential effects depending on their sequential order. 
In this case, OVE compared establishments that received both sequences of treatments 
(credit before other or other before credit) corresponding to the same combination 
with a control group comprising establishments that received only credit. Comparing 
coefficients can provide information on the significance and differences of the sequences. 
Business consulting treatment
Employment
Wages
Average years of schooling
Average age
Export range
Patents & trademarks
Observations
Treated 
group
20.32947
334.8684
7.226045
31.52295
0.1134021
0.0051546
194
Non-treated 
group
16.05611***
417.7371***
7.218393
31.64098
0.0960957
0.0013932
29429
Region of  
common support
16.14668** 
418.1541***
7.219202
31.60226
0.0965845
0.0014018
29429
Nearest 
neighbor group
7.5009***
358.9682
7.74047***
29.90064***
0.023753**
0.0
421
Note: *, **, and *** indicate that the difference in means test is statistically significant (using the treated group as a benchmark) at the 10, 5 and 
1% levels respectively.  
Source: OVE’s elaboration
4Credit programs did particularly well: it is the only type of support that significantly affects all outcome variables. Export support is well targeted, since this type of 
intervention has a significantly positive impact on exports-value range.
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4Results
A. emPiricAl results
1. Single Treatment Impacts
Table 3 reports the estimates of the impacts of each type of intervention on the four 
outcomes of interest.87 
 
Credit support: higher positive impacts. Overall, credit support has the most 
significant positive impact on employment and wages. It thus has significant potential 
to affect social outcomes through employment generation. The estimations suggest that 
Table 3. Impact of SME Support on Employment, Wages, Exports-value Range, and 
Patents and Trademarks (2001 Baseline; Nearest Neighbor Sample)
Notes: (a) ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level. (b) Estimations control for the stratification of the 
groups. (c) The italicized values refer to the number of observations used in the respective regression.
Source: OVE’s elaboration.
Credit  
Agglomeration
Export
Innovation
Consulting
3.018***
(11.64)
162024
1.419**
(2.39)
17352
2.578***
(4.17)
24684
0.166
(0.08)
2640
3.652**
(2.06)
5064
0.0142***
(5.63)
161674
-0.00745
(-1.12)
17300
-0.00279
(-0.47)
24632
0.0158
(0.61)
2640
-0.00425
(-0.43)
5037
0.0112***
(2.99)
162024
-0.0108
(-1.36)
17352
0.0448***
(3.14)
24684
0.0854**
(2.19)
2640
0.0106
(0.55)
5064
0.00174***
(2.84)
162024
0.00218
(1.56)
17352
0.00591**
(2.09)
24684
0.0138
(0.98)
2640
0.00111
(0.64)
5064
Employment
(1)
Log wages
(2)
Exports-value
(3)
Patents and 
trademarks 
 (4)
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establishments that received credit support experienced a 13% increase in their number 
of workers (3.0 jobs per establishment).88 SMEs in manufacturing generate employment 
for 4.2 million workers. If credit support has the same average effect and is available for 
all establishments, then this implies a generation of approximately 546,000 extra jobs 
in SMEs in the manufacturing sector alone. Participating in a credit program also 
resulted in a 1.4% increase in wages and significant gains in exports-value range89 and 
trademark registration. For every 1,000 firms that received credit support, on average, 
nearly 2 of them registered a trademark. 
Exports: well-targeted support. Export support is well targeted, since this type 
of intervention has a significantly positive impact on exports-value range. Export 
promotion also produces benefits for employment: SMEs that received this support 
increased their number of employees by 11% on average (2.6 jobs per establishment). 
This would also imply a generation of nearly 462,000 extra jobs in the manufacturing 
sector alone. Export promotion does not affect wages, but its impact on patents and 
trademarks is significant, since six additional trademarks are registered for every 1,000 
establishments that receive support. 
Innovation support: positive impact on exports. On average, participation in an 
innovation program did not lead to the registration of additional trademarks and did 
not affect wages or employment, but it had a positive impact on exports-value range.
Business consulting:  positive impact on employment generation. The estimations 
suggest that business consulting support alone has a positive impact on employment. 
The establishments that received business consulting support experienced nearly a 
16% increase in their number of workers (3.6 jobs per establishment). The result is 
statistically significant only at the 5% level but it is robust when using alternatively 
the nearest neighbor matching estimation with 2002 as the baseline (see Table 
A.VIII.1 in Annex VIII).
Agglomeration: no robust impact. The estimations suggest that agglomeration support 
alone has a positive impact on employment. Nevertheless, this impact is small compared 
to the effect of credit, export and consulting services on employment and is statistically 
significant only at the 5% level. Furthermore, robustness tests based on alternative 
estimations presented in the Annexes V and VIII indicate that the positive impact of 
agglomeration support on employment is not a robust result.90 In addition, there is no 
indication of a positive impact on wages, patents and trademarks, or exports value for the 
establishments that participated in this program. 
2. Impacts from Combinations of Treatments
This section analyzes whether the combination of credit and another type of 
support produces an additional impact on the outcome variables if compared 
with the impact already produced by credit support alone. Table 4 presents the 
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estimations of the additional impact on outcome measures due to the provision 
of credit in combination with another type of SME support.91 As the comparison 
group comprises establishments that already received credit support, the 
coefficients reflect the impacts additional to credit, and they are also able to capture 
the synergies or combination-effects against isolated treatments.
a. Synergies: Credit with Exports and Business Consulting  
The combination of export support and credit programs provides an increase 
in export value in addition to credit alone, strengthening the idea that export 
programs are well targeted. In addition, the impact of credit and export support 
on innovation is significant. The combination of both treatments led to the 
registration of an additional 12 trademarks for every 1000 establishments on 
average.
Establishments that sought business consulting and that also participated 
in a credit program experienced a greater increase in employment than 
comparable ones that received only credit. As the coefficient in Table 4 shows, 
when combined with credit support, business consulting not only promotes 
employment but also almost doubles the individual impact of credit. SMEs 
that received business support in addition to credit increased their number of 
employees by 16% on average (3.7 jobs per establishment).
Table 4. Combination of Treatments: Impact of Credit Support in Combination 
with Other Treatments (2001 Baseline; Nearest Neighbor Sample)
Agglomeration
Export
Innovation
Consulting
1.613
(1.05)
6552
1.889
(1.61)
10728
6.385
(1.55)
1164
3.740**
(2.42)
2496
0.00325
(0.31)
6546
0.00402
(0.50)
10721
0.00500
(0.20)
1161
-0.00760
(-0.45)
2496
-0.00590
(-0.30)
6552
0.0786***
(3.69)
10728
0.0615
(0.64)
1164
-0.0287
(-0.96)
2496
0.00295
(0.72)
6552
0.0119*
(1.94)
10728
-0.0123
(-0.51)
1164
-0.00224
(-1.43)
2496
Notes: (a) ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level. (b) Estimations control for the stratification of the 
groups. (c) The italicized values refer to the number of observations used in the respective regression.
Source: OVE’s elaboration.
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b. No Synergies: Credit with Agglomeration and Innovation  
Establishments that received agglomeration support in addition to credit did 
not perform better than those that received only credit. Although credit support 
affects all outcome variables and agglomeration support affects employment, the 
combination of these two programs does not provide additional-to-credit impact 
on the outcome variables.92 
It has been shown that innovation and credit support alone each led to an average 
increase in exports. However, the results suggest that the combination of these 
interventions does not result in an additional positive effect on exports when 
compared with the effect of credit support alone. These results imply that the 
hypothesis of lack of synergies between credit and agglomeration and credit and 
innovation support cannot be rejected.
3. Duration of the Program Effect Impacts
The treatment effect estimations indicate whether a type of intervention affects 
outcome variables but do not shed light on the elapsed time after which the treatments 
lead to the highest level value in outcomes. Thus, OVE also estimated the duration of 
the programs’ effects (Table 5).
The coefficient of interaction between years and treatments allows for the estimation 
of the number of years that the treatment impact reaches the highest outcome values. 
For cases in which there is a negative interaction coefficient,  the treatment impact 
Single 
treatment
Table 5. Duration of Program Support Effects (2001 Baseline; Nearest 
Neighbor Sample)
Single treatment
Credit 
Agglomeration
Export
Innovation
Consulting
Credit plus other treatment
Credit+Agglomeration
Credit+Export
Credit+Innovation
Credit+Consulting
14.93
5.03
2.04**
1.54
2.90
-1.00*
1.12**
3.09
-2.57
9.11
1.99
-0.55*
1.39
1.01
0.81
0.52*
-2.68
5.14
23.34
2.98
3.46**
6.23
0.87**
1.02
11.30
1.26
-3.16
-10.39
7.67
11.21
-3.30
-3.47
-1.77
3.97*
144.35
-14.64
Notes: (a) The quotients shown in the table were obtained by the expression shown in footnote 94 and explained in Annex III. (b) These 
quotients can be read as “number of years” only when the coefficient of interaction γ of the FE specification is significant and negative. (c) * 
denotes the presence of significant and positive coefficient of interaction γ. (d) ** denotes the presence of significant and negative coefficient 
of interaction γ. 
Source: OVE’s elaboration.
Employment
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reaches its highest outcome values after a number of years following the treatment.95 
The cases in Table 5 that are non-significant coefficients do not provide any useful 
information.
The results show that for export support alone, the highest level on employment 
and exports-value range is observed 2.04 and 3.46 years after the first treatment, 
respectively; when combined with credit, export support’s effect on wages peaks 0.52 
years after the treatment.
4. Sequencing Effect Impacts
The panel data constructed for the evaluation allow OVE to further contribute to 
policymaking by providing evidence on whether the sequencing of the combination 
with credit analyzed in the previous section matters. Table 6 shows the impacts for the 
sequences of a credit intervention followed by other treatments. 
In the panel data used in the regressions, there are no observations of firms that 
received export and consulting treatments before receiving credit. The regression of 
other treatments followed by credit did not show any significant result (see Annex X).
For agglomeration and innovation, the sequence of credit followed by these 
treatments had no impact on outcome variables when compared with credit treatment 
alone, regardless of the sequence of the combination. Credit and consulting services 
Table 6. Sequence of Treatments: Impact of Receiving Credit Support First 
Followed by Other Support (2001 Baseline; Nearest Neighbor Sample)
Agglomeration
Export
Innovation
Consulting
-3.633
(-0.88)
684
3.366***
(2.71)
10654
5.938
(0.67)
594
4.032**
(2.50)
2485
0.0278
(1.02)
683
0.00134
(0.17)
10654
0.00895
(0.27)
594
-0.00815
(-0.46)
2485
-0.00960
(-0.15)
684
0.0820***
(3.54)
10654
0.0104
(0.08)
594
-0.0280
(-0.87)
2485
0.0226
(0.85)
684
0.0112*
(1.70)
10654
-0.0266
(-0.90)
594
-0.00239
(-1.43)
2485
Notes: (a) ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level. (b) Estimations control for the stratification of the 
groups. (c) The italicized values refer to the number of observations used in the respective regression.
Source: OVE’s elaboration.
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are always simultaneous or preceded by credit, and results are similar to Table 4. 
However, receiving credit prior to export support (Table 6) generates a higher 
significant impact on employment than when both types of support are received 
simultaneously (Table 4).  
b. discussion oF results
The analysis shows that some interventions generated positive results, but the 
overall findings should be read with caution. First, the overall impact ignores 
general equilibrium effects. Second, the assessment does not incorporate spillover 
effects on indirect beneficiaries of some interventions. Finally, some types of 
interventions are expected to produce medium and long-run effects, which could 
not be captured by the available timeframe of the database used by OVE.
Credit programs did particularly well: it is the only type of support that significantly 
affects all outcome variables. Furthermore, the combination of credit and business 
consulting or exports has an additional positive effect on employment and export, 
respectively. 
The positive impacts of SME credit programs on employment are aligned with the 
findings of other empirical studies in Brazil and worldwide. De Negri et al. (2011) 
found that SME access to Brazilian public credit lines has a significant and robust 
positive impact on employment, although they did not find evidence of a significant 
effect on productivity (real wages as a proxy). More specifically, Machado et al. 
(2012) also found positive impacts on employment from the use of the BNDES Card 
by micro and small enterprises in Brazil.  These impacts are confirmed by studies 
focused on SME programs worldwide. Eslava (2012) found that beneficiaries of 
Colombian Foreign Trade Bank Bancoldex credit resources had achieved over 19% 
and 22% growth in employment and productivity. Brown and Earle (2013) showed 
a 25% (3 jobs on average) positive effect of the U.S Small Business Administration 
Services loans on employment. 
The literature and the results of this evaluation show that credit lines are an effective 
tool for promoting employment generation and increasing wages among SMEs. 
The success of credit lines could be related to the incentives the program design 
creates. SMEs should use the funds not only for working capital but also to invest in 
goods, such as transportation equipment and computers that ultimately boost their 
performance. Thus, appropriately designed credit support emerges as an attractive 
policymaking tool to increase employment and wages in SMEs.96
The Brazilian credit program incentives have also been effective in improving 
SMEs’ performance on other outcomes, such as exports and innovation. The results 
suggesting that credit is also an effective tool to increase exports is in line with De 
Negri et al. (2011) and with Molina and Roa (2014) that show the positive effect 
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of public credit lines on exports in Brazil and Colombia, respectively. Molina and 
Roa (2014) argue that the availability of external financing for the firms’ operational 
variable costs plays a central role in determining a manufacturer’s decision to enter 
into exporting. Credit programs also performed well regarding innovation. Credit 
thus emerges as a policy tool to increase exports to the extent that firms can allocate 
the necessary extra resources to innovative activities and explore new markets. 
Greenaway and Kneller (2007) argue that firms exposed to new markets can scale up 
their production but also need to be more efficient and increase their investments 
in innovation to tackle external competitors. The positive result of credit support 
on exports might thus be related to investments necessary to compete with external 
competitors in global markets. 
The results of previous empirical studies are mixed regarding the validation of 
the “learning by exporting” assumption.97 For instance, Ortega et al (2013) did 
not find results to support the “innovating by exporting” hypothesis but found 
that Chilean firms that invest more in research and development tend to become 
exporters. However, Crespi and Zuñiga (2010) found that apart from export 
efforts, cooperation has also played an important role as one of the determinants of 
innovation in Latin American countries.
OVE results encourage future research regarding the “learning by exporting” 
hypothesis. Although there are no data available to measure productivity gains, 
export programs were able to bring positive impacts both in export-value range 
and patent and trademark outcomes.  Firms more exposed to competitive markets 
should not only innovate but also protect their innovations from these competitors.
The characteristics of export promotion programs reinforce the findings of Crespi 
and Zuniga (2010) that cooperation also boosts exports. The fact that the programs 
evaluated by OVE involve articulation among SMEs to organize fairs and road shows 
abroad to promote their products and learn about export opportunities can help 
explain the success of these programs. OVE results suggest that export promotion 
support may be important to provide establishments with opportunities to start 
selling and learning by conducting business with foreign markets. Interestingly, 
OVE’s results show that support focused on export promotion increases its power 
to leverage export-value range and patent and trademark registration when it is 
combined with credit support.
Another important finding is that innovation support has no positive impact, either 
alone or when combined with credit, on a firm’s trademark and patent registration, 
but it does affect exports. These results suggest that innovation support might be 
related to product and process innovation, which allows SMEs to export. Blyde et al. 
(2014) found that both export and innovation promotion in Chile favorably impact 
firms’ exports and also identified evidence that the programs are complementary.
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The finding that innovation support does not necessarily translate into trademarks 
and patents should be read with caution. As analyzed in the context section, 
innovation programs are expected to produce short, medium and long-run 
effects, which reflect the different stages of their intervention model. The available 
timeframe of the dataset could not allow the capture of potential impacts on the 
issuance of patents and trademarks.98 
Another striking result is that while business consulting presents positive results 
on employment when provided alone, when combined with credit support, it 
leads to a significantly positive long-term impact, even higher than credit support 
alone although with a lower significance level (5%).99 Firms that received business 
consulting had the lowest average wage among all other treatments, an indication 
that these firms do not have adequate managerial skills. This may be an indication 
that firms seeking these services aim to boost their productivity by improving their 
management, processes, and practices. Nevertheless, to improve these aspects, 
new investments may be necessary, and credit becomes necessary to make business 
consulting work. Another possible explanation of the synergy between credit and 
business consulting programs could be related to the intrinsic nature of business 
consulting itself. For instance, the value added from accountability or healthy 
finance workshops could be larger for those firms with access to formal credit. 
Business consulting presents positive results 
on employment when provided alone. 
However, when combined with credit 
support, it leads to a significantly positive 
long-term impact, even higher than credit 
support alone.
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On the downside, OVE found that agglomeration services do not lead to any 
positive impact on outcome variables except for a non-robust significantly 
positive impact on employment. These results apparently contrast with Garone 
et al. (2012), who found that firm-level performance (employment and exports) 
benefits from cluster policies.100 There are three important remarks. First, Garone 
et al. focused this evaluation on a limited number of cluster programs in Brazil 
(in the states of São Paulo and Minas Gerais), while OVE included all programs 
implemented nationwide. Second, as explained before, OVE estimated the impacts 
of activities aimed at supporting agglomeration economies, such as value chain, 
cluster, and local productive systems in Brazil. Lastly, one possible explanation 
for the lack of average effect of agglomeration support may derive from the fact 
that cluster support, which is one of the most important activities classified by 
OVE under this category, may have been provided for groups of entrepreneurs 
in economies that cannot be characterized as clusters—and thus an intervention 
designed to develop clusters would be ineffective.101 
The evaluation findings suggest synergistic gains from the combination of SME 
programs. Credit boosts the effect of export promotion on export-value range and 
trademark registration. In turn, business consulting boosts and sustains the effect 
of credit on employment. 
Although the data used in the evaluation do not contain information to provide a 
cost-effectiveness analysis, the evaluation indirectly allows policymakers to think 
about the cost-effectiveness of credit interventions. Credit programs are always 
reimbursable, even though credit is subsidized. Thus, the results might well be in 
line with the suggestion of Brown and Earle (2014) that the provision of subsidized 
credit may be a relatively low-cost way to generate employment.
5The results are positive and synergies have been found, highlighting the importance of coordination among institutions that support SME programs.
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5Final Remarks
This evaluation uses nationwide data to examine various 
SME programs in Brazil. Overall, the results are positive and 
synergies have been found, highlighting the importance of 
coordination among institutions that support SME programs. 
This overall impact ignores general equilibrium effects and 
should be read with caution. Nevertheless, it is illustrative of 
the overall potential impact of SME support in Brazil.
This study illustrates how complex evaluations using microdata can be feasible 
and can address the lack of impact assessment of these programs. Nevertheless, the 
evaluation has limitations. Data were not available on SME revenues, loan amounts, 
or precise export values, which would have allowed a more refined analysis of the 
impact of SME programs on the outcomes of interest. In addition, information 
was not available on the implementation costs of the programs, so an analysis of 
their cost-effectiveness was not possible. Finally, the evaluation only focused on 
manufacturing SMEs and did not assess the extent to which various regions benefit 
differently from each specific intervention or a combination of support.
Follow-up studies should incorporate other SME programs and should explore 
other aspects of the program analyzed. All evaluated programs are public and 
provided for free or a subsidized basis. A focus on program implementation and a 
cost-effectiveness analysis would indicate the determinants of success and reveal the 
types of support that are more cost-effective. 
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schemes.
23 See McKenzie (2012) for a review of business consulting program evaluations in developing countries. 
The Bank supports several programs aimed at lowering transaction costs, reducing informality, and 
improving regulations and market operations. These interventions may include policies regarding 
business registration, property registration, and regulatory frameworks. The project CO-T1268 
(Strengthening Financial and Capital Supervisory Agency) is an example of a Bank project aimed at 
improving the SME business environment.
24 See, for example, Attanasio et al., 2011; Rosholm et al., 2007.
25 See, for example, Schmitz, 1995; Schmitz and Nadvi, 1999; Giuliani et al., 2005; and Martin 
et al., 2011). It could be argued that cluster is a more popular typology for these types of SME 
programs. OVE uses agglomeration because, although cluster has been widely used to name local-based 
development projects; it has been used in a broad and vague manner (Martin and Sunley, 2003). In 
fact, most cluster-based development programs work with the definition of “sizeable agglomeration 
of firms in a spatially delimited area,” as set out by Altenburg and Meyer-Stamer (1999). Similarly, 
Van den Berg (2001) argues that cluster is mostly related to a local or regional dimension of networks.
26 During 2000-2001, IDB supported 36 cluster-related operations amounting to US$650 million 
(IDB-DP-214). The projects CH-L1019, PE-L1035, JA-L1012, AR-L1022, UR-L1020, and 
BR-L1092 are examples of similar interventions. Pires et al. (2013) and the World Development 
Report (World Bank, 2009) highlight the potential impacts on SMEs of industrial agglomerations.
27 Martin et al., 2011.
28 Crespi et al., 2011
29 Lundvall and Borrás, 2005; and Romer, 1986, 1990.
30 See Audretsch and Link, 2012. CR-L1043 (Innovation and Human Capital for Competitiveness 
Program) is an example of the Bank’s support to SMEs related to innovation. OECD (2013) indicates 
that innovation policies in general do not discriminate in favor of SMEs. However, many countries 
promote the integration of information and communication technologies in the SME sector. 
31 See Volpe and Carballo, 2010b. PN-L1014 (Competitiveness and Trade) and UR-L1007 
(Programmatic Competitiveness Loan) aim to help SMEs access foreign markets. There is limited 
evidence on the effectiveness of export promotion on SMEs in developing countries, but Volpe and 
Carballo (2010a) provide evidence that smaller and relatively inexperienced firms, as measured by 
their total exports, benefit most from promotion actions.
32 OECD, 2010.
33 OECD, 2013.
34 See Castillo et al., 2013b. In addition, the Bank is sponsoring a research project on Brazil, Costa Rica, 
and Mexico that includes studies focusing on the direct and indirect effects of cluster development 
interventions and on innovation spillovers.
35 See Tan and Lopez-Acevedo (2010; Long and Zhang, 2011; and Machado et al., 2011. 
36 A number of similar papers focus on developed countries, but they do not provide a thorough 
comparative analysis (e.g., Zecchini and Ventura, 2009; Martin et al., 2011; Chandler, 2012).
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37 The difficulty of performing a more comprehensive analysis based on multiple treatments arises 
from the need for extensive firm-level data. An evaluation that intends to shed light on how 
different types of support affect SMEs’ outcomes requires identifying each individual firm and 
establishing whether it participated in various programs. This is not an easy task and explains the 
scarcity of studies that take a comprehensive approach.  
38 The Strategic and Planning Department, the Department of Research and Chief Economist, the 
Integration and Trade Sector, and the Competitiveness and Innovation Division are the Bank’s areas 
involved in these efforts. For instance, see Alvarez et al., 2012.
39 The General Law on SMEs of 2006 defines annual turnover as the annual income, including all taxes.
40 The Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics uses the same criterion as SEBRAE to 
define SMEs. For retail and services, SEBRAE defines microenterprises as having 9 employees 
or fewer, small enterprises as having 10 to 49 employees, and medium enterprises as having 50 
to 99 employees. For industry and construction, SEBRAE defines microenterprises as having 19 
employees or fewer, small enterprises as having 20 to 99 employees, and medium enterprises as 
having 100 to 499 employees. 
41 See Häner, 2011. These statistics do not include medium firms. 
42 Production and distribution of electricity, gas and water, construction, public administration, 
defense and social security, as well as international organizations and extraterritorial institutions are 
not classified under the manufacturing sector for the purposes of OVE’s analysis.
43 SEBRAE, 2013.
44 OECD and ECLAC, 2013.
45 The development of a road-based and regionally concentrated transport infrastructure has played 
an important role in creating Brazil’s high levels of economic spatial concentration, which are 
particularly high when compared to countries similar in size, such as the US. (Moreira et al, 2013).
46 On August 7, 2014, the General Law for Micro and Small Businesses was modified to increase 
flexibility with regards to taxes and to include more sectors, particularly service sectors that were not 
covered under the original law implemented in 2007. This new measure will benefit approximately 
450,000 businesses and 140 activities with annual revenues of up to US$1.6 million. In addition, 
the National Single Registry, a new tax model, will be created to drastically reduce bureaucracy, and 
the computerization of records will accelerate the process of opening and closing a business.
47 IFC, 2011. Apart from the cost of taxes, which is already a major problem, entrepreneurs in Brazil 
also have to deal with the fact that Brazil has hundreds of thousands of norms regarding when, how 
much, and how to pay taxes (SEBRAE, 2013).
48 Brazil ranks 76 out of 144 and scores 4.0 out of 7.0 on infrastructure requirements based on 
the Global Competitiveness Index (World Economic Forum, 2014). Logistics costs particularly 
hamper SMEs as they complete production phases in-house and need a business environment with 
low transaction costs to facilitate business-to-business trade relations (OECD, 2014).
49 For instance,  managing customs paperwork for exports of agricultural commodities in Brazil can 
take 12 times longer than in European Union countries (a full day versus a couple of hours) (World 
Economic Forum, 2014).
50 The backlog in patent processing and trademark registration reduced from 8.3 in 2010 to 5.4 years 
in 2011 (Moura et al., 2014). The authors estimate that a reduction of this backlog from 5.4 to 2.8 
years, considering the US as a benchmark, would imply an increase of 0.1% in Brazil’s economic 
growth in the long run. 
51 Although public agencies and financial programs targeting SMEs dated from the 1960s, most of 
Brazil’s SME policies focused on financial initiatives and were short-lived (Ferraro, 1995).
52 SIMPLES Law (1996) and SME Statute (1999) established the foundation for the SME legislation. 
In 2006, the Congress passed a new law for SMEs combining federal, state, and municipal taxes 
into one system (New SIMPLES Law)
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53 In this regard, see the 2003 Industrial, Technological and Foreign Trade Policy, the 2008 Productive 
Development Policy, and the 2011 Bigger Brazil Plan. 
54 The National Council comprises 13 ministers, 10 entrepreneurs, and 3 trade unionists. ABDI is the 
executive secretary of this Council, and its board is named directly by the President.  
55 The agency’s top management body, the Deliberative Council, comprises representatives from 
the public sector (Ministry of Development, Industry and Trade, its Foreign Trade Chamber, the 
Ministry of External Relations, and BNDES) and the private sector.
56 Created in 1972 as a public center responsible for providing managerial assistance to SMEs, 
SEBRAE became a private nonprofit organization in 1990. SEBRAE is funded by a monthly social 
contribution paid by employers.
57 Over 30,000 items can be purchased using the BNDES Card, including vehicles, equipment for 
commercial automation, computers and peripheral products, software, refrigerators, gondolas, 
sewing machines, stationary engines, pumps and equipment for service sites, kits for natural gas 
engines, health care and dentistry equipment, commercial furniture, and paper.
58 Apart from these evaluated programs, BNB also implements the largest microfinance program in 
LAC, known as Crediamigo, and the rural microfinance program, known as Agroamigo. 
59 An upfront sum of 3% of the financed amount is discounted to create a reserve fund of up to 30% 
of the total amount financed. The SME’s shareholders provide 20% of the total in guarantees, and 
the remaining 50% is guaranteed by a Credit Guarantee Fund created by the local partners.
60 The Metrology Bonus enables companies to access, at a lower cost, the calibration and testing 
services available at a national network of various laboratories that operate in partnership with 
SEBRAE.
61 RAIS, provided annually by the Ministry of Labor, was established by Law nº 76.900 of 23/12/1975 
to provide labor market information for the government and for research purposes. 
62 Salary Bonus is the annual payment of a minimum wage to workers in businesses, private entities, 
and public agencies that contribute to the Social Integration Program or Civil Service Asset 
Formation Program. Every establishment that has an official identification number contributes to 
these programs. Only workers that have been registered as formal employees for at least five years 
and that have received up to two monthly minimum wages in the previous year qualify to receive 
this benefit.
63 RAIS became a well-established set of data in 1985. During the 1990s, it benefited from important 
advances in data quality. Since 1997, the data have been collected via Internet, which makes the 
data collection process quicker and more reliable. The Ministry of Labor considers the data to be of 
good quality and coverage from 2000 onward.
64 SECEX microdata are publicly available at: http://www.desenvolvimento.gov.br/sitio/interna/interna.
php?area=5&menu=2413&refr=603
65 The impact on direct beneficiaries comprises only one component of the social returns of some 
of these programs. Their rationale is also related to externalities and spillover effects. Although 
relevant, the tracking of the impact of the programs on indirect beneficiaries – through labor 
mobility or geographical localization of firms – is beyond the scope of this evaluation.
66 This is known in the literature as the fundamental problem of causal inference: it is impossible to 
observe the outcomes of the same unit in both treatment and non-treatment conditions at the same 
time (Holland, 1986). In an experimental design that consists of randomly dividing a representative 
sample into a treatment and a control group, the researcher aims to ensure that on average both 
observable and unobservable characteristics are balanced between the treated and untreated units, 
making the two groups comparable. In non-experimental designs, the research relies on a variety of 
statistical control strategies to reduce bias.
67 Heckman (1979) shows that if there are unobserved factors affecting both the outcome itself and 
the probability of selection into the sample, the regression coefficients are biased and inconsistent. 
See also Griliches et al. (1999) for a discussion on selection bias.
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68 In addition to the FE model, OVE applies difference-in-difference (DID) estimation as a robustness 
test purpose. The estimation strategy that uses a combination of PSM at baseline and the DID 
estimator is suggested by Crespi et al. (2011).
69 In turn, the DID model also controls for omitted variable bias by defining the counterfactual as 
changes in outcomes for the control group. DID estimation compares the before-after changes 
observed in the treated and non-treated establishments. This counterfactual change is then 
subtracted from the change in outcomes observed for the treatment group and the impact is 
estimated by DID. The first difference estimation used in the report is analogous to this strategy. 
See Ashenfelter and Card (1985) for a seminar paper applying DID, Duflo (2001) for a reference 
of a DID evaluation in developing countries, and Bruhn and McKenzie (2013) for an application 
of DID that is similar to the one used in this evaluation.
70 See Bruhn and McKenzie, 2013.
71 The adequacy of using PSM at baseline requires a time-invariant difference in these explanatory 
variables between the treated and control establishments. PSM also mitigates the selection bias 
derived from the potential correlation between establishments across different periods of time. See 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1982) for a seminal paper on PSM.
72 Age and education of firm employees were analyzed regardless of the job position. To conduct the 
PSM, OVE applied a probit (probability plus unit) model and controlled for geographical location 
and  activity. A probit model is a type of regression in which the dependent variable can only take 
two values: zero or one. 
73 See the results of the propensity score regressions in Annex IX. Different PSM specifications led 
to similar qualitative results. The results of the probit estimates indicate that the coefficient of the 
average age of employees is negatively related with participating in a SME support program in 
all types of support, except for export treatment where this variable is not statistically significant. 
Interestingly, the probit estimates indicate that education is more important to determine 
participation in innovation and export programs. This result might be related to the fact that SMEs 
that innovate and export require employees with higher education levels. The higher the level of 
human capital is, the higher the probability of participating in a SME support program. For the 
other types of support, human capital is negatively related to the treatment or has a negligible 
influence in participating in a program.
74 The summary statistics of treated and control groups are presented in the next section.
75 The region of common support is defined as the area of overlap with observations of both treated 
and non-treated units.
76 The Nearest Neighbor technique matches establishments from control groups to treated groups 
based on the closest propensity scores. See Garone et al. (2012) for an example of estimation that 
applies nearest neighbor matching before the beginning of the program.
77 For a detailed explanation of the FE and DID models run by OVE, see model specification in 
Annex III.
78 Attrition bias occurs when the dropout of establishments generates a misinterpretation of results by 
changing the characteristics of treated and control groups and outcomes, regardless of the treatment.
79 For more details on attrition bias tests for panels, see Fitzgerald et al. (1998), Alderman et al. 
(2000), Alderman et al. (2001), and Verme (2008).
80 These results (similarities between the means of the main variables in balanced and unbalanced 
panels) are valid for both treated and non-treated groups.
81 This estimation can be considered a test of anticipatory effects. As for the use of lagged outcomes 
to test the unconfoundedness assumption, see Imbens-Wooldridge (2009). For the application of 
a specification allowing the testing of a placebo effect, see Stucchi et al. (2014). For a complete 
discussion on tests based on anticipatory effects, see Angrist-Pischke (2008).
82 In the case of credit interventions, the common support of the propensity score spans nearly the 
entire set of establishments.
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83 As explained earlier, the nearest neighbor matching technique selects from the control group only 
the most similar establishment to each treated establishment based on their probability of being 
treated.
84 Annex XI (Tables A.XI-1 and A.XI-2) breaks down Table 2 by providing the number of observations 
by year of entry to the program.
85 To reduce the chances of collinearity by adding too many dummy variables (region and sector 
dummies) in the probit regression, OVE chose to control for sectoral variation in the FE model 
rather than in the probit regression. The literature of observational impact evaluation accepts as 
good practices either including exogenous variations in the probit regression or adding them as 
controls in the FE model.
86 The estimations for the impact of SME support services on innovation should be interpreted with 
caution as preexisting trends are not parallel.    
87 As mentioned above, for the sake of robustness, OVE conducted alternative results using DID 
models. OVE also conducted robustness regression tests and found similar results by applying and 
not applying stratification of establishments (blocks) and using interaction with time. (See Annexes 
V, VI, VII and VIII).
88 The effective employment average is 23.36 for the sample of firms appearing over the whole period 
2001-2012. 
89 As explained earlier, the export data are in ranges. The magnitude of the estimated effect assumes 
that all establishments in a given “exports-value range” export the same average value. Thus, if the 
estimates generate a positive (negative) coefficient, it means moving up (down) across different 
ranges. 
90 The results using the whole non-treated group (“non-treated group” in the Table 2) as the control 
group indicate that there is no effect of agglomeration on employment (Table A.V.I in Annex V). 
In addition, robustness tests using FE and 2002 as the baseline also suggest there is no impact of 
agglomeration treatment on employment (Table A. VIII-1 in Annex VIII).
91 As in the case of individual treatments, Annex V provides, as a robustness test purpose, alternative 
results using DID estimations.
92 The effect of agglomeration on employment is significant at the 10% level; thus this result should 
be interpreted with caution.
93 Coefficient γ from the interaction of the variable treatment with time provides indication about 
the amount of time elapsed until the effect of a treatment reaches its highest value in outcomes. 
94 In this case, the amount of time that elapses until the effect of a treatment reaches its highest value 
in outcomes is given by                             .
95 For the positive interaction coefficient, the mathematical maximum of the derivative of the 
treatment variable with respect to time does not exist after the treatment, and there is no useful 
interpretation of the result.
96 Tan and Lopez-Acevedo (2010) compare several SME programs implemented in Chile and find 
no significant treatment effects for credit and loan programs alone. This suggests that access to 
finance by itself is unlikely to spur firms to make the necessary technological changes to improve 
performance. This could be interpreted as corroborating OVE findings that “credit design” matters 
for explaining the effectiveness of these programs.
97 Regarding evidence from developing countries, Clerides et al. (1998) do not find learning effects 
in Mexico, Morocco, or Colombia. On the other hand, Alvarez and Lopes (2005) find evidence 
of learning by exporting in the case of Chilean firms, and Fernandez and Isgut (2005) find the 
same evidence for Colombian firms. For a survey of empirical studies on the relationship between 
exports, innovation and productivity, see Ortega et al. (2013).
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98 See for instance Benavente et al. (2007). The authors evaluated the Chilean National Fund for 
Technological and Productive Development (1998-2002) and found a positive impact of the 
program on process innovation and on the firms’ capabilities of interacting with external sources of 
knowledge and financing. However, the authors did not find evidence of any significant impact on 
the creation and adoption of new products during the timeframe used in their evaluation.   
99 It is important to note that resources allocated to agglomeration support or business consulting 
services may be used in activities not originally predicted by these programs. Pischke and Adams 
(1980) point out that the fungibility of resources may make programs difficult to evaluate.
100 Arraiz and Stuchi (2013) also found that programs with value chain characteristics produce a 
positive effect on employment in Chile.
101 Pires et al. (2013) suggest a methodology to identify potential clusters that could be used to test 
whether cluster projects have a positive impact in regions identified as potential clusters. 
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